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I. INTRODUCTION
The Republic of the Philippines (RP) has a rolling four-
year development plan. The government supports this plan in
five functional areas: economic development, social develop-
ment, national defense, debt service, and general administra-
1
tion.
The government has an annual budget that is 30 percent of
Gross National Product and is increasing. In contrast to the
organization of the development plan, the budget is mainly in
terms of object classes of expenditures: personal services,
supplies and material, equipment, and capital outlays. These
expenditures are aggregated by government bureaus and depart-
ments. In 1957, there were attempts to group expenditures by
activities that cut across bureau and department lines. These
2
efforts have not been successful. Accounting reports are
classified by expense classes of expenditures and sources of
funds, such as general, special, fiduciary, and bond funds.
In this situation, planning cannot be effectively linked
to budgeting. They are related to each other in terms of the
Four-Year Development Plan, FY 1974-77, Republic of the
Philippines, Condensed Report, Bureau of Printing, Manila,
1973.
2
The account contained in United Nations Manual for Pro-
gramme and Performance Budget, 1965, (ST/TAO/Ser .C/75) is
more favorable. This will be explained later.

total sum of government fiscal operations and government or-
ganizations that somehow fall under each of the five functional
areas of the development plan. However, the plans for action
during a budget year are the government programs. The broad
objectives of plans can only be effectively realized through
annual expenditure programs. At the national level, these
programs cut across department and agency lines. At the de-
partment and agency level it cuts across bureau lines. Un-
fortunately, resources are not allocated, accounted, and evalu-
ated in terms of programs. Thus, in the formulation of plans,
adequate data on program costs and outputs are not available
for a systematic consideration of alternatives. As a conse-
quence, responsibility centers are not adequately provided
with policy guidances, among other things, for a responsive
participation in government programs.
The critical importance of programs, by itself, in the
Philippines can be gleaned from a few examples. They are
population control, land reform, grains, and infrastructure.
The country is now number fifteen in the world in population
and is increasing at three per cent per year. The land owned
by a small fraction of the population is being redistributed.
However, landlords have to be compensated and farmers have to
be supported with funds, equipment, and utilities. Overnight
land ownership, if it can be done, does not mean overnight
increases in production. Self-sufficiency in rice and corn
is considered adequate to compensate for the additional foreign
exchange needs of the recent succession of oil price increases.

The communication, transportation, and utility distribution
networks in RP were destroyed during World War II.
When martial law was declared in late 1972, the first
presidential decree reorganized the national government. The
first paragraph of the Declaration of Policy, Article I of
the Plan, said: "The proposed departmental organization will
enable the department to plan and implement programs in its




This policy provided for the creation, integration, and
strengthening of planning units in all government departments.
All departments were required to organize a Planning Service
4Staff and a Financial and Management Service Staff. A
planning staff consisted of planning, programming, and statis-
tics divisions. A financial staff was an integration of all
budgeting, accounting, financial reporting, internal auditing,
and management improvement functions.
The martial law administration has, therefore, given
priority recognition to the planning, programming, and
3See Reorganization Plan, Presidential Decree No. 1,
Manila, Philippines, Bureau of Printing, September 29, 1972.
4Article III - Planning Service, of Reorganization Plan,
directs that "planning services will be staffed by profession-
al and competent planners who can relate departmental plans
and programs to the national development plan, and who can
make wide but judicious choice of modern planning techniques."
Article IV - Financial and Management Service, of same Plan,
directs that "comptrollership shall aim at a system of budget-
ing and financial reporting as well as of gathering meaning-




budgeting problems. In turn, the advocacy for improved sys-
tems and procedures has gained ground with the creation of the
administrative set-up. This development was also due to the
grouping of offices and bureaus on the basis of major func-
tions. The duplication and overlapping of activities within
and among departments were reduced. It enabled the Office of
the President to decentralize management of present programs
to the departments of primary responsibility. Within depart-
ments, the importance of the program approach to allocating
resources among competing bureaus and the control of bureau
performance in terms of department objectives is beginning to
be seen.
For example, in the functional area of National Defense,
all related government agencies such as police and coast
guard forces were integrated into a new Department of Defense.
The next move was to create a so-called uni-budget system
which was a consolidation of existing budgets. The Defense
Department, however, will still be organized internally accord-
ing to land, sea, and air elements. The integrated forces,
which are programs, will perform defense missions across
organizational lines. A current example is the unified
command engaged in combatting rebellion in the Southern
Philippines. The force is primarily Navy and Marines, and
the Navy commits a very large proportion of its resources to
this mission. Yet, the Navy has the lowest budget, because
resources are allocated by military services and not • pro-
grams. To be able to support this activity, the Navy has to
sacrifice other important activities. The same thing happened
10

to the Army in the 1950* s when the major military problem
was counterinsurgency in Central RP
.
The essential problem, therefore, is a lack of a system-
atic formulation and review of programs that will implement
government plans. At the department level, there is no
programmed means to carry out department's objectives within
the framework of the national objectives. Consequently,
government resources are not systematically budgeted, accounted
or evaluated in accordance with program costs and outputs.
Neither do program costs and outputs effectively constrain
national development plans.
In 1965, a new budgeting system installed in the United
States federal government claimed to solve problems similar
to those now faced by the RP government. It is called the
Planning-Programming-Budgeting-System (PPBS) . The aims of
PPBS are to: provide improved decision-making methods, re-
cognize program costs and outputs in planning and budgeting,
5
and make a systematic analysis of program alternatives. The
difficulties that were encountered in the implementation of
this system and the scarce materials that were then available
created an impression in many countries that PPBS was far too
advanced for them to apply to their plans and budget. When
the U. S. federal government stopped using PPBS at the Bureau
5See David Novick, Current Practice in Program Budgeting
(PPBS)
, Crane, Russack, New York, 1973, pp. 12-13.
See Itshak Galnoor and B. M. Gross, "The New Systems
Budgeting and Developing Nations," International Social
Sciences Journal, 21, 1969, p. 31.
11

of Budget level in 1971, any remaining interest in studying
PPBS evaporated in other government circles.
A new interest, however, has been generated in RP under
the impetus of the martial law reforms. Specifically, there
is now a closer recognition of planning and budgeting prob-
lems. In addition, the U. S. has accumulated over ten years
of PPBS experience. It was preceded by 50 years of budget
reforms, in the same period that the Philippines was a colony
of the U. S. The PPBS experiences of at least nine other
countries are also available now. These countries have
learned from the U. S. model and from one another. They also
have employed PPBS within the parliamentary form. It is
toward this form that RP is moving and for which it is train-
ing its civil servants.
This paper examines whether PPBS can improve Philippines
government planning, programming, and budgeting as well as
its general management functions.
12

II. FUNDAMENTALS OF PPBS
PPBS is essentially a system for systematically formulat-
ing and reviewing programs that implement plans and allocate
7
resources. It focuses on outputs or objectives of programs,
determining the best alternatives to attain a given output.
Toward these ends, PPBS uses program budgeting and program
analysis, two techniques that are mutually supportive. They
are, in turn, supported by an information system. PPBS has
three areas of consideration: structural, information and
analytical.
A. STRUCTURAL ASPECTS
The first step in PPBS is to identify and examine objec-
tives. These objectives could emanate from a broad national
purpose such as attaining the individual and social well-
being of Filipinos. Towards such a goal, there are intermedi-
ate objectives such as social development and economic deve-
lopment. Under social development are more concrete objec-
tives in areas such as health, education, and welfare. Under
7 See E. S. Quade and W. I. Boucher, Sys tems Analysis and
Policy Pl anning, Elsivier, New York, 1974, pp. 6-7. PPBS was




The emphasis here is on PPBS area where difficulties in
understanding and compliance have been experienced. It is
also primarily addressed to Philippine readers.
13

welfare, for example, there are specific objectives dealing
with farmers, veterans, and aged. What results is a hier-
archy of objectives.
A hierarchy of objectives is the criterion for the pro-
gram structure. A program, in the PPBS sense, is an inte-
grated activity - a combination of labor, material, and capi-
9
tal whose output is related to an objective. Accordingly,
the activities are assembled by programs, sub-programs, and
program elements at respective levels of aggregation.
The building of the program structure does not have to
start from top to bottom. It may be more practical to start
from on-going programs which can be worked either upwards or
downwards. Then the balance of activites may be aggregated
upwards resulting in new identified programs.
At this point in program structuring, a re-thinking of
existing programs and activities will occur. For example,
the family planning program has outputs relating to reducing
poverty and decreasing infant mortality. It reduces poverty
by decreasing family size. It reduces infant mortality by
decreasing the number of children born to older women and
women. In turn, these objectives will be related to broader
functional objectives. As a result, the family planning pro-
gram may be better appreciated.
After a program structure has been matched-out to the
hierarchy of objectives, the outputs of the program categories
9 See David Novick, "Which Program Do We Mean m Program
Budgeting?", The Rand Corporation, P-530, May 12, 1954. It
emphasized that the program is also the primary unit for man-
agement and planning at the policy level.
14

are analyzed in terms of their respective objectives. This
is done for more specificity if not quantification. For
example, a highway construction program has operational out-
puts of kilometers of asphalt laid. However, the real output
of this program may be reduced transportation costs. In more
developed countries it could be in terms of safer and less-
congested travel. But outputs of this nature are not easily
measurable at all levels of the program hierarchy. This
difficulty is illustrated in Table 1.
TABLE 1 - THE MEANS TO ENDS CHAIN
Program Inputs Operational Program Program Well-being

























In this illustration, the items under Program Category
are at most sub-programs of a larger program. For example,
in the group where mail delivery is listed is telegram de-
livery which is also contributing to communications costs.
Likewise, maritime patrol may consist of an air and sea ele-
ment. When the operational outputs of activities or program
elements are mixed into program outputs of the next larger
grouping, it could be a combination of bananas and coconuts.
15

Thus, analytical approaches have to be developed to be able
to express the mixture of lower level outputs as the outputs
and then effectiveness of the next larger aggregate.
In recognition of this difficulty, the program outputs
may only be quantified at the level of the program elements.
In this manner, the proposed expenditure data can still be
related to performance. A program element, therefore, should
ideally cover agency activities related directly to the pro-
duction or provision of a discrete output or groups of related
outputs that can be combined. If possible, higher program
outputs may also be presented in unambiguous terms.
There are many government activities where the outputs are
identifiable, measurable, and significant. Examples are tons
of garbage, miles of roads constructed, hectares of land re-
forested, gallons of water provided, and hectares of rice
paddies irrigated. More difficult problems are presented by
intangible services, such as education and health; security
services, such as deterrence and law and order; non-routine
activities, such as staff services, data processing, and re-
search. In these cases, indirect measures such as number of
students and courses, number of patients, number of battalions,
See David Ott and A. Ott, Federal Budget Policy
,
Washington, D. C. : The Brookings Institution, 1969, p. 25.
See Planning-Programming-Budgeting, Committee on Gov-
ernment Operations, United States Senate, US GPO, 1968, p. 3,
It states that program elements should produce clearly defin-
able outputs, which are quantified wherever possible; and
wherever feasible, the output should be an end-product and




service duration, or intermediate activity measures may be
12
used. Except they are really inputs disguised as outputs.
After the possible measures of outputs are established,
the desired output levels are determined. Normally, there
are existing political decisions on the level of accomplish-
ment desirable. At any rate, these levels of outputs and the
alternatives to attain them are major considerations of the
program analysis that will be discussed later. Nevertheless,
PPBS does not start from nothing. There are statistical in-
dicators accumulated in the existing budgeting, accounting,
and information systems. The process of program structuring
draws from data that may not have seemed important in the
past.
For example, in determining the desired level of preven-
tion of traffic accidents, there are recorded data of yearly
mishaps. It will be ideal to aim at zero accidents. Not
everything, however, can be done for one objective specially
within a certain time frame. There are political and techno-
logical considerations. Above all, there is the constraint
of resources in a situation of competing objectives.
At the early stages of PPBS implementation, therefore,
some of the levels of outputs may have to be determined simul-
taneously with program costs. The program structure costed
for a fiscal year is the program budget. Some of the program
categories' costs and outputs may be crosswalked from the




historical accounting data or the fiscal ceilings of the
current year. When all the costs and outputs of program ele-
ments are available, the costs are aggregated into program
costs. The program outputs or effects are specified but in
most cases unquantif ied. A starting point is thus estab-
lished for the analysis of program alternatives that will be
discussed later. Systematic analysis has at this stage, at
least, program costs and the proxies of sub-program outputs
or program element outputs available.
The program budget is thus established. At this stage,
program effectiveness is not yet presented. Not all of the
items included in the program budget are economic costs and
13
all economic costs are not included in the program budget.
It only presents a list of proposed expenditures related to
the measured outputs of the program elements.
These financing requirements are projected several years
into the future, using the same program structure. This pro-
jection may be called the Multi-year Program Budget (MPB) , or
14
what was called Program and Financial Plan (PFP) . A PFP
for five years is not to be confused with the budget proposal
for five years. It is not a projection of future activities
in the sense that decisions may be made to reduce, enlarge,
or eliminate some program alternatives. The PFP projects the
13 See Werner Hirsch, "Toward Federal Program Budgeting,"
Public Administration Review , December 1966, p. 261.
See Attachment B (PFP Guidance) to Bulletin 68-9,




future implications of current budgetary decisions. It is
not a prediction of future decisions.
This extended time horizon is important in investment de-
cisions where the life-cycle costs of the equipment or asset
must be considered. It also reminds the resource mobilizer
and allocator that there are recurrent costs. These costs
may be covered by existing legislation outside of the annual
legislative process on the government budget.
To summarize, the structural aspects of PPBS consists of
the hierarchy of objectives, program structure, program bud-
get, and the multi-year program budget.
B. INFORMATION ASPECTS
Information systems that may exist in an organization are
the traditional budget; the accounting system that supports
that budget; the financial reporting system; non-monetary
statistical reports in the areas of personnel, material, and
capital assets; and other management information systems.
These systems support the requirements of planning and con-
trol.
PPBS puts an additional demand on all of the foregoing
systems. The program budget needs support for keeping track
of expenditures and progress of programs. The analytical
process needs data and information to develop indices that
will permit estimates of costs and benefits of alternative
courses of action.
15 In many cases the development of program budgeting has
been misunderstood as synonymous to the installation of a new
computerized management information system. See David Novick,
19

If the program budget does not replace the traditional
budget, the program structure will be converted into the
coding of the existing accounting, statistical, and reporting
systems. If the program budget becomes the basis for legis-
lative authorization and budget execution, then a program
classification is added to the structure of accounts. It
does not render obsolete the existing expenditure, activity,
and organization classifications. In a sense, the program
classification is an aggregation of the activity classifica-
tions. Likewise, the organization classification is an
aggregation of relevant program elements.
While much of the information of PPBS must come from
accounting records, there are formidable obstacles that must
be overcome. In the first place, accounting systems cannot
be developed until breakdowns of information to be furnished
to users are relatively firm. It may be too much to expect
also that program structures will spring into being without
a considerable period of experimentation and change. Second-
ly, even when program categories are firmly set, it will take
time to redesign accounting systems, particularly automated
ones, so that they can accommodate the demands of PPBS.
Present accounting systems are geared to current cost
concepts which are oriented toward obligations, organizational
15Current Practice in Program Budgeting (PPBS) , CR New
York, 1973, p. 15.
PPBS may be a tool for legislative consideration of the
annual budget. In some cases, PPBS is only used at the execu-




and appropriation breakdowns that fit traditional budget
patterns. These breakdowns will not be discarded by PPBS.
because financial controls and accounting information will
continue to be required by organizations and object expendi-
17
tures. At the same time, the PPBS demands will be on cost
accounting for cost-benefit analysis.
Ultimately, it will not be enough for an accounting set-
up to be able to collect spending data by program elements
and responsibility centers. It must also establish a close
18link between the two. If a responsibility center works
under more than one program element, there will be a separate
set of accounts for each program element at each responsibili-
ty center. The sum of the expenses for a given program ele-
ment at all the responsibility centers concerned is the total
expense for the program element. This sum is needed by pro-
gram analysts. The sum of the expenses for all the program
elements participated upon by a given responsibility center
gives the total for that responsibility center. This sum is
needed by the operating manager and the command.
If there is no close correspondence between program ele-
ments and responsibility centers, proliferation of the account
17
"I now feel that the advantages of the existing budget
structure far outweigh the disadvantages which are principal-
ly mechanical, namely the need to translate program categories
into budget categories and vice versa." See Charles Hitch,
Decision-Making for Defense , University of California Press,
1965, p. 30.
18 See Robert Anthony, "Closing the Loop Between Planning




sets may result. An extreme and commonly-cited example is
when telephone communication is identified as a program ele-
ment. In this case, there will be a telephone account for
every responsibility center in the organization. The paper-
work and computing time may be tolerable, but the diffusion
of responsibility for a given program element, especially if
no one manager has a material concern, makes management con-
trol very difficult.
Thus, it may be necessary to re-think the program struc-
ture, discussed in the structural aspects, when the account-
ing system is being redesigned to serve PPBS. Match-outs of
program elements with organizational units should be maxi-
mized. For example, if a program element is spread among
several organizations across the country, the review and
evaluation of the program to include collection of data will
be difficult. The last resort is reorganization. It will
certainly be an advantage, if during the design of PPBS, a
reorganization is going on.
Finally, a specific information system installed in the
first application of PPBS at the United States Department of
Defense (US DOD) is the Program Change Control System (PCCS)
.
As will be discussed later, in PPBS application, the original
continuous review of programs was discontinued as far back as
191961 in favor of an annual review.
19 See "Interview with US DOD Comptroller," Armed Forces




The acceptance of PPBS has been impaired by its close
association with modern decisional technologies for program
analysis. Program analysis means the analysis of alternative
means of achieving program objectives, which could be the
least-cost combination of program elements to achieve a given
output, or the maximum benefit given a budget constraint.
Actually, there are systematic analyses that precede pro-
gram analyses. First, there are the existing analyses in the
planning and budgeting that PPBS aims to integrate or link.
For example, the Philippine Department of National Defense
20has a Strategic Objectives Plan. From this plan may be de-
rived the hierarchy of objectives that will serve as the cri-
terion for the Defense program structure. Strategic analysis
may also have established important objective levels like num-
ber of battalions or aircraft for certain situations and con-
tingencies. On the budgeting side, it has activity classifica-
tions within organizational units, each of which has a speci-
fied task and a unit of measure. A program element is normal-
ly composed of these activities.
Secondly, there are the analyses involved in the struc-
tural aspects of PPBS. They are required in the matching-out
of programs with their respective objectives in the hierarchy;
in the establishment of initial objective levels for which
program costs will be computed to formulate a program budget
20Civilian departments do not normally have an equivalent
process. Their planning may be the development plan deve-
loped at the Office of the President's level.
23

and a multi-year program; and in the possible re-thinking of
the program structure when the information system is being
redesigned to accommodate program budgeting.
Thirdly, if inter-program comparisons are made in the
level of the department or interdepartment , then the analysis
on the component program elements becomes component studies
of the larger program. As will be explained later, as the
area of analysis becomes more complex and the qualitative
factors become more dominant, the analytical tool becomes
more complicated. The less complicated tools become founda-
tions for the more sophisticated ones.
The analytical techniques for program analysis that will
be briefly described in this section will be familiar to those
who have background in engineering, economics, and general
management. How these techniques fit in PPBS is the main con-
cern here, since how they are done is better covered in more
21
authoritative materials. The list includes but is not
limited to systems analysis, cost-effectiveness analysis,
cost-benefit-analysis, capital budgeting, linear programming,
ratio analysis, and down to Gantt chart techniques. In PPBS,
they are proposed to be routinized as tools of decision-making
resulting to annual budgetary choices or future budgetary
decisions.
21
For example, Charles Hitch and Roland McKean, The
Economics of Defense in the Nuclear Age (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1960), pp. 109-118 and pp. 182-187; and
Arthur Smithies, Government Decision-Making and the Theory of
Choice (Santa Monica: The Rand Corporation, 1964), P-2960.
24

It may also be used outside of PPBs by the same analyti-
cal staff. For example, the government-sponsored Ali-Frazier
boxing match in Manila has been subjected to considerable
economic analysis. But boxing, after the suspension of Con-
gress, is not a recurrent budget activity. With the directed
staffing of the planning staffs of the reorganized departments
with competent personnel, these techniques may be employed on
selected programs even before a comprehensive program struc-
ture is established. In so doing, getting bogged down in
identifying goals, sub-goals, activities and so forth, and
their complicated relationships, might be avoided. However,
unless activities at all levels can be interrelated, if not
quantified, in some kind of goal structure, the significance
of many decisions and actions may be indeterminable.
1 * Analytical Techniques
In the total PPBS operations, there are analytical
problems ranging from progress reporting and control of
activities and programs to major program allocation decisions.
Progress reporting and control is part of management
information systems which keep track of programs where the
decisions have already been made. It detects impending diffi-
culties as the program is being implemented and makes remedial
actions possible through a feedback mechanism. In so doing,
it provides data for subsequent program analysis.
The techniques used are financial reporting and man-
agement accounting methods, especially cost accounting,
critical path methods now in use at the Infrastructure
25

Operations Center in Manila and the Cavite Naval Shipyard,
and also Gantt chart techniques for project planning and con-
trol.
Not only are these techniques keeping track of pro-
grams crossing organizational lines but they are also moni-
toring responsibility centers. The program framework fur-
nishes an outside dimension to the efficiency measures for
management control. Thus, the efficiency measure is not seen
as a simple ratio for a narrow task but in the larger program
perspective.
Another group of analytical techniques are those
associated with operations analysis and management science.
There are many operations in government where such techniques
are applicable. Examples are: lease or buy computers, rout-
ing Navy cargo ships to collect rice from southern ports for
shipment to Manila, routing postal service vehicles to collect
mail from deposit boxes, and how many shifts to employ in the
shipyard to optimize patrol capability and maintenance costs.
These techniques may be used to evaluate programs or to deter-
mine the most efficient alternative in a situation where what
is efficient is clear. The known mathematical methods are
linear programming and queuing models. The latter are now
being applied in the Philippines Post Office and are known to
apply in airports, service facilities and maintenance depots.
Linear programming is also applicable to transporting grains
to milling centers and warehouses.
The next category of analytical techniques has to do




original source of the term "systems analysis." It in-
volves the planning and design of new weapons systems to do
what has never been done before or to perform existing opera-
tions better. Sometimes this procedure is called systems de-
sign or systems engineering.
In some cases, it may be merely an analytical apprecia-
tion of an existing analysis behind a foreign weapons system
for acquisition. In other cases, it will involve determining
alternatives out of indigenous humand and material resources.
A missile gunboat acquisition under this analysis will con-
sider not only comparable elements like other ships, air force
planes, or army artillery pieces, but also supporting elements
such as repair facilities, training facilities, and communica-
tion facilities. A gunboat will also be analyzed as to its
subsystems. Most of these related elements are furnished to
the analyst by the program structure.
It is one thing, however, to be able to appreciate the
tactical design and timeliness of delivery of a weapons sys-
tem and another to consider the deployment of the system as
an instrument of national policy. In the former case, there
are severe constraints not only in funds but also in foreign
exchange limits. In the latter case, the factor of conflict
comes in, which is the interaction with the enemy. It is not
one's alternatives and costs that are the main problem. As
22
E. S. Quade and W. I. Boucher, Systems Analysis and
Policy Planning, Elsevier, New York, 1974, p. 9.
27

will be shown later from US DOD experience, the analysis of
procurement and supply of hard weapons has been emphasized
over the less quantifiable effectiveness aspects of these
weapons.
While analysis of policy alternatives in one area like
defense is already complicated, PPBS is still involved in a
much wider area of analysis. There are major allocative de-
cisions such as whether more resources should be employed in
national defense rather than in reforestation or irrigation.
Ideally, the marginal return for each of the areas of a given
budget should be equal. The quantitative analytical tools
now available are not considered able to deal directly with
analysis of different programs. Decision problems become more
difficult when it involves more than efficient allocation of
resources among alternative means for a known task. In major
program decisions the level of objectives must first be deter-
mined resulting to a problem of - not only how to do it but
what ought to be done. Studies to help with these problems
23
are called systems analysis.
Systems analysis is also perceived interchangably with
cost-effectiveness analysis. The latter is better remembered
as a stage of the former. Cost-effectiveness compares alter-
native courses of action in terms of their costs and effective-
ness in attaining a specific objective. Usually the criterion
is to minimize costs subject to some fixed performance
23See E. S. Quade, "Systems Analysis Techniques for
Planning-Programming-Budgeting , " P-3322 (Santa Monica, Ca
The Rand Corporation, March 1966).
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standard, or conversely to maximize performance subject to a
budget constraint. Thus, the term cost-effectiveness analy-
sis.
However, there are many facets of a problem aside
from alternative choice. There is the establishment of
acceptable objectives, the determination of a satisfactory
way of setting a standard of performance, the design of bet-
ter alternatives, and qualitative factors.
Therefore, the development of an analytical capabili-
ty for problem areas of this complexity is at least a long-
range matter. It is this very difficulty which confronts more
advanced nations, that makes systems analysis expertise the
least worry of less advanced nations. In the Philippines,
the context of the problem is much narrower and a wide range
of alternatives is not available. In addition to severe con-
straints, mentioned earlier, there are the lack of new tech-
nology and preponderance of basic problems such as food,
clothing, and shelter. The alternatives, therefore, are sub-
jectively pruned by circumstances. But with a disciplined and
orderly analytical process they are nevertheless objectively
compared. In a sense, systems analysis is any orderly analy-
tic study designed to help decision-making among possible
alternatives for a preferred course of action. When systems
analysis is further applied to small component systems as is
the case in PPBS, the intuition and judgment of the decision




2 . Analytical Documents
In PPBS, the documents that result from program
analysis are called program memoranda (PM) and special
analytic studies (SAS) . A PM emanates from program issues
determined by higher authority or initiated by the depart-
ment. They are questions requiring decisions in the current
budget cycle and having critical implications on percent or
future costs as well as the consequences of a program choice. 24
A PM presents a comparison of the cost and effectiveness of
alternative means of resolving problem program issues in re-
lation to their objectives. As a minimum, it should contain
the agency head's decision and the rationale for decisions
made. The PM's do not normally cover the whole structure of
25
a program, but deal rather with important issues.
The SAS provides the analytical groundwork for the
PM's on which choices of alternatives of programs and program
elements are based. How elaborate an SAS is depends on analy-
tical capability, time frame of decision-making, availability
of estimating factors, and the demands of higher authority.
2 4 See David Seidman, "PPBS in HEW: Some Management Issues,
Journal of the Institute of American Planners , 36, No. 3 (May
1970), p. 169. See also US Bureau of the Budget Bulletin No.
68-2 to the Heads of Executive Departments and Establishments:
Planning-Programming-Budgeting (PPB) , July 18, 1967.
25
In 1966, the agencies attempted to comply with submis-
sion of PM's without limitation as to length and number re-
sulting in a flood of PM's making PPBS identical "with the
production of useless reports for people who would never read
them." See Fremont Lyden and Ernest Miller, Planning




The traditional budget cycle in the Philippines is simi-
lar to that of the United States except that in the period
of martial law the legislature is suspended. The cycle con-
sists of preparation phase, legislative authorization now
assumed by a Presidential Development Budget Committee (PDBC)
,
execution phase, and auditing and reporting phase. PPBS im-
pacts on the preparation phase extending it such that instead
of the six months required for the departments to prepare the
budget for submission to the legislature in January, this
phase may start at least six months earlier.
As an illustration, assume that this is January 1976.
By this time, a program structure has been designed; the bud-
get being passed upon by the PDBC for Fiscal Year 1977 is a
program budget; and the multi-year program covering FYs 1976-
1981 is in force.
During this period the departments and agencies with the
focus on FY 78 will be in consultation with the Budget Com-
mission and PDBC for identification of program issues regard-
ing the direction, scope, and size of agency programs. Issues
left over from FY 77, as well as new issues, will be raised.
Consideration of these issues will lead to discussion of
analytic studies that will be required. These studies may
be interim in nature to affect target FY 78 or laid to cover
two or three-year periods.
From April to September of 1976, the agencies initiate
and complete analytic studies needed to reach agency head
decisions on program issues identified by higher authority;
31

conduct intra-agency review on the execution of budget in FY
76 for which analytical studies may or may not have been
made, and prepare the agency PM's and multi-year program. In
July, the multi-year program will be updated to remove FY 76
and add FY 82.
In October of 1976, the Budget Commission commences re-
view of submitted PM's, SAS ' s , multi-year programs, and FY
78 proposed program budget. Since the PDBC is also a presi-
dential body, this Budget Commission review may be extended
to the period from January to March of 1977. At the same
time, the program issues for FY 79 will be considered while
the budget proposals for FY 78 are being reviewed.
From April to June of 1977, the PDBC acts on the FY 78
budget as submitted by the Budget Commission, and the Presi-
dent issues a presidential decree for the authorization of
the FY 78 budget.
32

III. BUDGET REFORMS BEFORE PPBS
The evolution of PPBS consists of three stages of budget
2 6
reforms: traditional, performance, and PPB. Each stage
had a major functional orientation, namely, fiscal control,
management control, and planning, respectively. Fiscal con-
trol deals with the procedures and limits on government agen-
cies regarding expenditure ceilings, propriety in expenditures,
object classes and sources of funds. Management control deals
with the budgeting of approved goals into specific projects
and activities that are the most efficient for the accomplish-
ment of prescribed tasks. Planning, as a major orientation
27
of PPBS, was discussed earlier.
All budgeting systems, even in developing countries, have
these three functions. Major reforms alter the balance of
these functions resulting in a change in major orientation.
The emphases on previous orientations do not have to be de-
creased. Organizations have a way of either saturating the
personnel performing the three functions or creating addi-
tional staffs.
See Allen Schick, "The Road to PPB: The Stages of Bud-
get Reform," Politics, Programs and Budgets (Edited by James
Davis), Englewood Cliffs, N.J.: Prentice Hall, 1969, p. 210.
This framework, developed by Schick, is the most widely used
in PPBS literature.
27 For the distinction between planning, management con-
trol, and operational control, see Robert Anthony, Planning




Roughly corresponding to the three stages of budget re-
forms was the sequential development of budgetary concepts:
inputs, outputs, effects and program alternatives, in that
order. The traditional stage was input-oriented for fiscal
control; the performance stage related outputs to inputs for
management control; and PPB stage expanded the concept of
outputs to less quantifiable effects in order to make system-
atic choice of program alternatives for planning. These
stages and concepts, however, did not follow each other in a
neat sequence. The latter stages occurred before the objec-
28tives of the preceding stages were fully realized.
The framework for analysis that will be used here are the
major legislative actions that embodied the budget reforms:
the Budgeting and Accounting Act of 1921 and the Budget and
Accounting Procedures Act of 1950. The stages of budget re-
forms and the corresponding sequential development of concepts
are covered in what happened before and after these budgeting
landmarks. These Acts were also the bases for the Philippines
Commonwealth Budget Act of 1925 and the R.P. Revised Budget
Act of 19 54. An examination of these public laws will not
only bring insight on the relevance of prior budget reforms
to the concepts and application of PPBS but serve as a remind-
er of the origins of the RP budgeting system. As such, it
is open to reexamination.
2 8
In a sense, what is nev; in budgeting is the more complex
areas of analysis, since even the traditional stage deals in
alternative choice of expenditure levels. See Bertram Gross,
"The New Systems Budgeting," Public Administration Review ,
March/April 1969, p. 123.
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A. THE U.S. BUDGET AND ACCOUNTING ACT OF 1921
The conceptual development of this Act started in 1900
when President Taft appointed a "Commission on Economy and
Efficiency" which produced the "Need for a National Budget"
report. This was after the Spanish-American War and before
World War I, when economic scarcity in relation to new Ameri-
can purposes were beginning to be felt. The report proposed
formulation by the Executive of estimates of receipts and
expenditures for ratification by Congress. It was patterned
after the British system, where the Cabinet has the initia-
tive in the budget process.
Taft did not succeed in ushering executive budgeting into
what was then an era of the congressional budget. This era
was characterized by particularization of inputs by the
29Congress, a procedure shared by members of the Cabinet.
When President Wilson took over, he favored some kind of
budget reforms, having been active reforms while in the
academic community. In 1916, the "Institute for Government
Research, which later became the Brookings Institution, came
into being. It worked effectively for the establishment of
a national executive budget.
In 1920, a Budget and Accounting Act was passed by the
U. S. Congress. By this time, a movement for reforms was
supported by all political parties. It highlighted the
29 See John E. Dawson, "Origins of the Federal Budget Pro-
cess," Armed Forces Comptroller
,
April 1975, pp. 2-7. He
illustrated particularization of inputs by an appropriation




inefficiencies and waste that could have been used instead
for emerging government programs. The budgeting breakthrough,
however, did not succeed; President Wilson vetoed it because
presidential power was threatened by the General Accounting
Office (GAO) to be created by the Act. President Harding
signed nearly identical legislation enacted as the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921.
With political resistance overcome, the executive pro-
ceeded, through the Bureau of Budget, to apply the law as en-
visioned by reformers a decade before. As an indication of-
the necessary support from the Presidency, Harding asserted
that it was nothing less than "... the greatest reformation
31in government practices since the beginning of the republic."
A new obstacle was the attitude of department heads to deal
in terms of their respective spheres, having been used to the
former congressional practice of particularized budget esti-
mates. The Budget Director was only able to exercise control
32for the President by cutting departments to size.
The function of fiscal control turned out to be the major
orientation. The role of management control and planning
lost out. The executive budget cannot easily be synthesized
because it was deeply rooted in the particularized budgeting
of the prior era.
30Richard Cronin, "Years of Reform and Development,"
Armed Forces Comptroller , April 1975, p. 9.
31Richard Cronin, Ibid, p. 9.




This became the traditional stage of budget reform, where
the dominant activity is expenditure control and where the
watchdogs symbolized honesty, legality, and economy. The key
word was fiscal accountability: the prevention of funds from
being stolen, used for unauthorized purposes, or spent at un-
controlled rates. Accordingly, the budgetary techniques re-
quired were detailed and comprehensive listings of inputs of
expenditures, frequent accounting reports, pre-audits of
transactions even by central agencies, and field audits with-
out consideration of the internal control system of the agen-
cies concerned. The expertise developed was rooted in
labyrinthine rules and regulations displayed in the numerous
technical definitions about authorizations, obligations,
expenditures, objects of expenditures, apportionment, dis-
bursements, advance payments, repayments, guarantees, continu-
ing appropriations, trust funds, fiduciary funds, post audits,
and pre-audits.
Beginning in 1935, however, the traditional emphasis on
fiscal control started to crack. Cost-benefit studies sur-
faced in the debates on water resources development between
the Corps of Engineers and the Bureau of Reclamation. Presi-
dent Roosevelt organized a "Committee on Administrative Man-
agement" in 1937 to establish, among other things, a merit
33
In the RP case, it can be shown that the resulting web
of red tape can be taken advantage of ingeniously to achieve
the opposite effects of control by those who know the ropes.
On one hand, it can develop a perception by the line of finan-
cial management as distinct from command and leadership. On
the other, it can lead to the further narrowing of the func-




system in the civil service. Meanwhile the difficulties of
the war effort imposed additional challenges on the govern-
ment as well as led to improved applications of scientific
management in the private sector. Scientific management and
the merit system influenced the idea of efficiency and not
merely economy and honesty, as an important budgeting goal.
Thus, by 1940, the executive budget was considered converted
34from law to fact. Its concepts had been introduced 30 years
earlier
.
The original intent for a more balanced interplay of con-
trol, management, and planning functions, however, was not
realized. Later, the fiscal control orientation was to be
confronted with new problems of comprehensive budgeting of
semi-autonomous and government profit-making enterprises,
the question of depreciation of capital assets, and the multi-
pocket sources of funds due to heavy transfers from within
or from without a budgeting entity.
B. THE BUDGETING AND ACCOUNTING PROCEDURES ACT OF 1950
The factors that hastened the substantial realization of
the Budget and Accounting Act of 1921, influenced the legis-
lation of the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950.
The impetus of U. S. national spending was pronounced before
World War II, with the New Deal broadening perspectives of





government responsibilities and the influence of Keynesian
economics on public spending. As long as the government was
considered a necessary evil, there was little recognition of
the social value of government expenditures. As a conse-
quence, the main function of the budget was to keep spending
in check. However, as the work and accomplishment of public
agencies came to be regarded as benefits, the task of budget-
ing correspondingly changed.
With the expansion of government services, the bits and
pieces presentation of expenditures became less and less
significant while the aggregation of activities performed be-
came more to the Presidency. With the perceived relationship
of public spending to the condition of the economy, summariza-
tion of the budget by macro-functions, such as national de-
fense, health, and debt service, became necessary. Even for
purposes of fiscal control it became costly and difficult for
higher government officials to keep track of the myriad ob-
35ject classes of expenditures, without the use of computers.
During World War II, the magnitude of U. S. government
spending increased even more. Prior to and during the war,
the practitioners of scientific management had been advocat-
ing efficiency and productivity in government. They were also
behind the merit system in the civil service that contributed
in the upgrading of public service. This improvement, along
with new statutes and regulations, decreased the administrative
35
In developing countries, scarcity of manager time is




abuses that gave rise to an overemphasis on control of the
traditional system. This routinized, control-minded approach
of the Bureau of Budget was castigated by the Committee on
Administrative Management, created by Roosevelt in 19 37.
This Committee also caused the transfer of the Bureau of the
Budget from the Treasury to the Executive Office of the
President, which it recommended and was subsequently created
by a reorganization plan in 1939. The Budget Bureau staff
was increased tenfold, mostly from the ranks of public admin-
istration rather than from accounting. In 1948, a coopera-
tive effort by the General Accounting Office (GAO) , the
Treasury, and Bureau of the Budget launched the Joint Account-
ing Improvement Program (JAIC) . Gradually, the cost account-
ants and university-trained public administrators were re-
cruited into the operating staff of JAIC.
The formal stimulus, however, for the Budget and Account-
ing Procedures Act of 1950 came from the Commission on Organi-
zation of the Executive Branch, popularly known as the First
Hoover Commission. The pattern of interaction between budget
reforms and reorganizations has continued from the tradition-
al stage. In this second stage of reform, a commission was
mandated by the Congress to submit plans for the consolidation
of services, activities, and functions of similar nature. It
was also directed to define and limit the executive functions,
3 fi
Allen Schick, op. cit., p. 218
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services, and activities. However, its major accomplishment
37
was the concept of a performance budget.
The First Hoover Commission recommended that "... the
whole budgetary concept of the federal government should be
refashioned by the adoption of a budget based on functions,
activities, and projects: this we designate as a performance
38budget." A performance budget identifies the output of an
organization, provides information on its quantity and quali-
ty, and then relates output to input. The argument then can
be considered very simple now: by focusing on input-output
relationships, the same output may be achieved with fewer in-
puts, or alternatively, the same inputs may generate more out-
puts. By that time, this concept had long been established
in American business organizations, which in practice attempt
to know what they: have done, are doing, or want to do, with
the inputs they use. The orientation, therefore, is manage-
ment control, and the key word is efficiency.
The performance budget concept was initially introduced
by law in the National Security Amendments Act of 1949. This
was the reorganization of DOD , but it carried as Title IV the
establishment of a comptroller set-up in the defense department
39
and the adoption of a performance budget. In 19 50, the
37
In contrast, the R.P. Reorganization Commission of 1972
did not go far enough to changes in budget concepts and systems
38Commission on Organization of the Executive Branch of
Government, Washington, D. C. , 1949, p. 8.
39
"... the military budget system has broken down. The
budgetary and appropriations structure of the Army and Navy
are antiquated. They represent an accumulation of categories
41

Congress expanded the DOD application into the Federal govern-
ment through the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950.
This law has a Part II, which is sometimes called the
Accounting and Auditing Act of 1950. This portion is virtu-
ally unnoticed in PPBS literature but has great relevance to
budgeting. First, it gave statutory recognition of the basic
principle that the primary responsibility for properly account-
ing for and controlling the administration and use of Federal
funds rested with agency management. As such, the law
authorized the retention of fiscal documents by fiscal agen-
cies at agency locations rather than require that they be sent
to some central GAO location for desk audits. The Hoover Com-
mission pointed out that the detailed checking of expenditures
was a duty of management and should be provided for as a part
of the system of internal control. They further noted that
the outside auditor should give due regard to how good a job
was being done by agency management in this respect before
deciding on what audit work he would do, since it is an un-
necessary expense for them to duplicate such work except in
exceptional circumstances.
39
arrived at on an empirical and historical basis. They
do not permit comparisons, they impede the administration,
and interfere in the efficiency of the Military establish-
ment." See First Hoover Commission Report, op. cit., p. 98.
40
In R.P., the resignation of the Auditor General, Budget
Commissioner, and Commissioner of Civil Service was accepted
last September 21, 197 5. However, procedures have yet to be
improved to go with shake-up in top personnel. See "Top




Second, the 1950 Act specifically recognized the Joint
Accounting Improvement Program, originally an initiative of
the Executive Branch. It directed that it be continued, as
a specific congressional policy. Later, the program was
changed to Joint Financial Management Improvement Program to
reflect its expanding concern with all elements of government
financial management. It now included the Chairman of the
Civil Service Commission and the Administrator of General
Services Agency and is manned by a full-time staff. In this
program, the GAO is empowered by law to prescribe principles
and standards for executive agency accounting systems rather
than specific detailed systems for each agency.
Third, it affected the GAO by an unprecedented reduction
of personnel from 15,000 in 1946 to 4,000 in 1966, due to
changes in methods and procedures. With the shift to site
auditing and improved fiscal control by agencies themselves,
GAO was also able to apply more emphasis beyond regularity of
transactions, legal compliance, and propriety and accuracy
of accounts. Now it deals with other matters such as effici-
41
ency and economy of operations and effectiveness of results.
The accounting and auditing aspects of the performance
budget received a further boost from the Second Hoover Com-
mission of 1955. It led to Public Law (PL) 84-863, which
Recent publicized GAO findings were on effects of mili-




required all agencies to install accrual accounting as soon
as practicable and added the dimension of programs to perform-
ance budgeting. Accrual accounting, however, which will prove
to be a critical item not only in performance but also in
program budgeting, is still in the process of implementation.
The Joint Financial Management Program projects that
it will be up to 1980 before all agency accounting systems
are approved.
The status of the accounting system has contributed con-
siderably to the unfinished business of performance budgeting.
The additional demands of PPBS on practically the same staff
also affected the performance budget effort. When PPBS was
introduced, output identification and measurement and costing
in activities not associated with hard goods, were not ade-
quate. Productivity measurements were limited to simple mail
distribution, disbursement, and equipment maintenance. The
studies sponsored by the Advisory Committee on Management
Improvement created by the President in 1952 fell into limbo
43
when the staff was reassigned to the PPBS effort.
The rationale for the PPBS stage of budget reform, how-
ever, is among other things, that outputs of critical programs
are too broad for performance budgeting to quantify and
Ellsworth H. Morse, Jr. , "Current Significance of the
Accounting and Auditing Act of 1959,
'
: The Federal Accountant ,
September 1975, p. 8.
Thomas Morris, W. H. Corbett, and B. L. Usilaner, "Pro-
ductivity Measures in the Federal Government," Public Adminis -
tration Review, November/December 1972, p. 753.
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and analyze. More often, outputs were confused with the
supposed effects or results of specific projects. For exam-
ple, performance budgeting will treat the quantity and quality
of public housing as outputs and relate it to labor and
material as inputs, when the presumed effect may be the re-
duction of juvenile delinquency. The resolution of the un-
finished task of performance budgeting therefore - the rela-
tion of operational outputs to inputs of resources, where
efficiency is the criterion - may yet be the side effect of
the application of PPBS. The same pattern was earlier men-
tioned, when the substantial completion of the traditional
stage of budget reform was mainly due to the factors and
application of the performance stage of budget reform.
In the next chapter, experience with the third stage of




PPBS requires more complex structures, advanced analyti-
cal tools, and complicated information systems. To illustrate
further, Table 2 is shown, using a proposed Coast Guard Pro-
grame in the Philippines Navy, which was substantially
patterned after the U. S. Coast Guard.
TABLE 2
COAST GUARD PROGRAM

























*Operations and Maintenance is further subdivided into
12 object classes of expenditures for a total of 15 objects
under the traditional classification.
**Aviation Operations together with Vessel Operations,
Repair Facilities, and General Support are preformance pro-
jects and are further classified with object classes of ex-
penditures under each project.
***Search and Rescue is a program element of the Coast
Guard Program like Law Enforcement and Aids to Navigation.
As such, the latter two program elements are also classified
with performance projects and object classes of expenditures
under each program element.
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In a traditional format: the structure consists of four
expense classes or 15 object classes of expenditures; the
analysis consists of alternative levels of expenditures by
organization or ratios on what a person or equipment needs
to operate; and the accounting chart consists of 15 accounts.
In a performance format: the structure consists of five pro-
jects, with at least the first three projects having a unit
of performance measure and specified task such as steaming
hours, flying hours, and man-days of repair; the analysis
consists of relating the operational outputs to inputs dur-
ing budget formulation and the actual performance to budget
performance during budget review, and the accounting chart
consists of 57 accounts. Each project consists of 14 object
classes plus the capital outlay, which is considered a project
as well as an object class of expenditure. In a program for-
mat, in a cascading fashion: the structure consists of three
program elements, each of which has all the performance bud-
get projects as activities; the analysis pertains to the
effects of operational outputs of each activity on the objec-
tives of each program element; and the accounting chart con-
sists of 180 accounts. The three program elements consist
of four performance projects each, which has 15 object classes
44
of expenditures, for a total of 180 accounts.
44 •Actually, this chart is overdrawn, since the size of
the Coast Guard Program is not material enough to warrant
the breakup of General Support and Administration and Capital
Outlays to each of the program elements in the accounting




PPBS assumed the unfinished business of preceding re-
forms, the prior accomplishment of which could have been
very helpful. An increase in comprehensiveness of budget
information, however , does not assure that a change in deci-
sional behavior follows. If information can influence be-
45havior, the reverse is also true. The actors may use form
and data to suit preconceived decisions. In this connection,
rationality or at least a mix of what is rational and what
is political in budgeting was assumed, conceivably. This
assumption was influenced by the increases: in the use of
economic analysis in budgeting and fiscal policy; in the use
of decisional and informational technologies; and in the con-
vergence of planning and budgeting in government. The latter
was mainly due to an ever increasing role of government which
46
was previously considered or disdained as socialistic.
How the reformers perceived the strength and limitations
of PPBS and its interaction with its administrative and poli-
tical environment can be gleaned from a deduced implementing
strategy when PPBS was applied at DOD in 1961 and at the
Federal Government in 1965. PPBS experiences also reveal how
the manner of implementation affected understanding of and
45See James E. Jernberg, "Information Change and Congres-
sional Behaviour: A Caveat for PPB Reformers," in Planning-
Programming-Budgeting , ed . by Fremont Lyden and E. Miller,
Chicago: Rand McNally College Publishing Co., 1972, pp. 102-
115.
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In developing countries, there is also an increasing
diversity of government agencies involved in related func-
tions for which reorganization and personnel revamp has been





attitudes towards PPBS. The advantage of foreign govern-
ments and organizations which adopted PPBS later was the U.S.
experience. How that experience was related to foreign en-
vironments is useful. U.S. PPBS application at Bureau of
Budget level was terminated in 1971 but it continued in
several Federal departments and agencies other than DOD and
in three states. What will follow is a description and analy-
sis of the implementing strategy and the results of such im-
plementation. Included in the results are present trends of
PPBS uses.
A. IMPLEMENTING STRATEGY
An implementing strategy for and administrative reform is
a function of the reform as understood, reform agencies, and
47its environment. In turn, it has sub-variables such as:
level of government involved (whether department, office of
the President or Premier, and Congress or Parliament) , scope
of implementation (whether by departments or government-wide)
,
speed of reform (whether results are expected in the short
run or long run from the total system or its sub-systems)
,
and timing of reform (whether there are forces, events, or
personalities that are working for or against the reform)
.
47For broad categories of administrative reform variables,
see Hahn-Been Lee, "An Application of Innovation Theory to the
Strategy of Administrative Reform in Developing Countries,"
Policy Sciences , 1970, pp. 177-189> and R. E. Peterson and
K. K. Seo, "Public Administrative Planning in Developing
Countries: A Bayesian Decision Theory Approach," Policy
Sciences
, 1972, p. 371.
49

1 . Level of Government Involved
PPBS in the U. S. was not a mandate of the Congress,
unlike preceding budget reforms. As such, a legislative pro-
gram submitted for authorization and appropriation was in the
older budget format. The appropriation accounts were not re-
structured and PPBS plans and analyses were for the use of
the Executive.
This approach reversed earlier ideas which suggested
a program budget for organizational decision-making and sub-
mission to the Congress, and an administrative budget for
48fiscal control and performance evaluations. The latter,
consisting of traditional and performance classifications, was
to be submitted to the Congress in broad aggregates. A pro-
gram budget was considered a more relevant instrument for the
policy-making function of the Legislative.
The motivations of the Executive in bypassing the Con-
gress will also be covered in the aspects of speed and timing
of reform. For its part, the legislature, was known to be
particularistic in budget interest and would not trade its
fiscal control over government spending for a larger policy
role. The closer was a congressional committee to the appro-
priations process, the less it would be enthusiastic about
esoteric analysis, unless it can be fasioned as a popular
instrument of legislative control. Thus, PPBS concepts were
48 -jSee Arthur Smithies , The Budgetary Process in the United
States, New York: McGraw Hill Book/co. , Inc., 1955, pp. 192-93.
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a subject of interest to advisory committees only such as the
Joint Economic Committee.
Actually, the U. S. Congress had a broad mandate to
evaluate administrative programs since the Budget and Account-
ing Act of 1921. This Act created the GAO with an analytic
role. Then the Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 1950
installed performance budgeting, where information on outputs
are designed for congressional as well as executive use. A
content analysis of Appropriations Committee hearings from
491951-64 by James Jernberg revealed that: budget information
on a particular performance program was only a part of open
information flows in which budget information had to compete
with other sources and committee members neither uniformly
reject nor embrace nev; information but instead used informa-
tion that met their preferences and needs.
It turned out that the Congress would tend to rely on
GAO and other technical congressional staffs in addition to
private sources of information rather than from the President's
budget. For PPBS analyses, therefore, they would have to
create organizations of their own, complete with computer and
systems analysts. The Executive or specifically a department
in a hearing may not be willing to reveal the program alter-
natives that were considered and rejected even if they may be






For such is the nature of checks and balances, with which most
developing countries have not been successful.
In contrast, a parliamentary set-up bypasses executive-
legislative frictions in policy making. For example, Canada
is governed by a Cabinet of ministers drawn from the majority
party. The policies and programs initiated by the Cabinet
are invariably enacted into lav;. Otherwise, the government
falls and elections are called to form a new government. The
Finance Ministry worries about revenues and the Treasury
Board (TB) worries about expenditures. The latter is a com-
mittee of ministers of the Cabinet and served by a secretari-
at. The bureaucracy serves both the Cabinet and Parliament.
A Privy Council Office (PCO) persuades and pressures all de-
partments to present available options for policy considera-
tion and provide staff assistance to Cabinet committees in
terms of necessary information and policy choices.
The most important Cabinet committee is the Priorities
and Planning Committee (PPC) chaired by the Prime Minister.
The PPC sets out expenditures guidelines, a year before the
beginning of the fiscal year from information and analysis
provided by TB secretariat and PCO. Then the TB works out the
allocation process. Major agenda are also inputed to PPC, a
coordinating committee, by functional committees such as the
Economic Policy Committee and the Social Policy Committee.
The level of abstraction generally increases as policy dis-
cussions move from functional to coordinating committees. As
an indication of a management by exception, Trudeau's Cabinet
deals only with three or four items in the first page of the
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Cabinet agenda - those items where decisions have not been
50
made in the committees
.
2 . Scope of Implementation
In early 1965, top officials of the Bureau of Budget
urged President Johnson to limit PPBS during the first years
to a few selected agencies that, like the armed services, have
some forms of program planning. They believed that the con-
ceptual tools needed slow and careful development. The
President, however, decided on the inclusion from the very
51beginning of all departments and most independent agencies.
The reasons for this aspect of the strategy of imple-
mentation can be attributed to the following: the perception
or understanding of PPBS was a function of an evaluation of
its prior successes, mainly at DOD. The DOD experience was
to be extended to civilian agencies. In 1961, however, the
Defense Comptroller also suggested a less comprehensive appli-
cation of PPBS. Comptroller Hitch believed that a whole year
should be spent designing the system and picking out a few
well-defined programs for a trial run.
Based on that experience, PPBS could be refined and
then extended department-wide. DOD Secretary McNamara not
only vetoed that approach but also directed a comprehensive
50 See R. V. Segsworth, "PPBS and Policy Analysis: The
Canadian Experience," International Review of Administrative
Sciences , Vol. 38, 4, 1972, pp. 419-25.
51Bertram M. Gross, "The New Systems Budgeting," Public
Administration Review, Vol. 29, 2, March/April 1969, p. 117.
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review of DOD information systems for purposes of both planning
52
and management control. PPBS in the U. S. not only had
active support from the very top, but aggressive leadership
as well. Since the leadership was confronted with a mammoth
bureaucracy, an effective way to introduce a major innovation
and make it stick was to push it across the board. Further-
more, the "millenium for rationality and efficiency" which
PPBS was oversold to achieve fitted into the atmosphere of
successes in space, the Great Society programs, and an accom-
53panying major war. A simple breakthrough in public adminis-
tration can hardly be perceived to fail amidst such euphoria.
Authoritarian set-ups in developing countries can also be
entrapped in a euphoria of initial successes.
The comprehensiveness of the approach can also be
explained or rationalized by the very nature of a systems
approach to management. Only in the U. S. case, McNamara and
Johnson acted the roles of both analyst and the manager. In
a systems approach, an analyst's findings could just be a
sophisticated re-expression of a manager's decision, and a
manager's decision could just be an experimental first or
54
second iteration of a systems analysis.
52See "Interview with DOD Comptroller," The Armed Forces
Comptroller , June 1964, pp. 2-5.
53See W. Ken Fisher, Jr., "PPBS in Proper Perspective,"
The Federal Accountant , Vol. 21, 2, June 1972, pp. 22-32.
54 See C. W. Churchman and A. H. Schainblatt, "PPB: How
Can It Be Implemented?," Public Administration Review , March/
April 1969, pp. 178-80.
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For example, the essential burden of PPBS is that
more resources are wasted when the wrong things are done
efficiently than can ever be wasted when the right things are
55done inefficiently. As such, its pioneers did not care much,
initially, about the unfinished business of prior budget re-
forms. It turned out that since plans are programs for ac-
tion, how the actions are evaluated and accounted were vital
to planning. Noted earlier, were the changing goals in DOD
PPBS over time: from a primacy of a program classification to
the realization that the old classifications were equally
important; from a continuous review of programs to an annual
review; and from a systems analysis of all programs to a
pragmatic possibility of a systems analysis without a program
budget and a program budget without systems analysis or a
little of both.
3. Speed of Reform
The bypassing of the Congress and a comprehensive scope
of implementation set the pace the Executive wanted. In
August 1965, PPBS was officially promulgated in the federal
government. A former Secretary of Commerce described the
introduction of the system to the Cabinet:
...the Cabinet members were called together
without any prior preparation and after a
brief summary by Budget Director Schultz,
ordered to put it into effect promptly.
There was no meaningful discussion of whether
55Novick, op. cit., p. 16.
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or not it would be applicable throughout
the Federal government even if success-
fully applied in Defense. 56
The Presidential memorandum was followed by Bureau of Budget
Bulletin 66-3, implementing PPBS, in October 1965. Since the
first target for a program budget was FY 68, the agencies had
only about six months - to recruit and train the necessary
staffs, issue implementing procedures, design the program
structure, conduct initial alternative analyses, crosswalk
the program costs to the appropriation structure for submis-
sion to Congress, write program memoranda and special studies
- to be able to submit rough budgetary estimates in May 1966.
It may be deduced that the intention was only for the
system to take roots rather than speedy results if the Presi-
dent were told of a few developments in the application of
PPBS at DOD such as: The objective of a continuous appraisal
of programs led to the elimination of budget ceilings. It
had the effect of encouraging the armed services to submit
virtually every project which conceivably had any merit at
all, including many which had been rejected in previous pro-
gram and budget reviews. The estimates were far in excess of
realistic totals, deep cuts had to be made during the budget
phase, and deferred programs swelled the multi-year program.
This was because many expenditures were delayed rather than
cancelled resulting in the Five-Year Program becoming an
Stanley B. Botner, "Four Years of PPBS: An Appraisal,"




unrealistic planning base. Then, in 1965, a new defense
comptroller took over at DOD with the principal object of
installing the accounting part of PPBS. It turned out that
the necessary loop from programming to budgeting to actual
performance to reporting and analyzing performance to making
a nev; program has to be closed to make PPBS effective.
Robert Anthony who replaced Charles Hitch as DOD Comptroller
said:
The lesson from this experience is that it
is relatively easy to install a modern pro-
gramming system and a program budget. This
is largely a headquarters operation, in-
volving relatively few people. It is tre-
mendously more difficult to install the
accounting system that provides the essen-
tial back-up for program and budgeting, for
this involves people at all levels in the
organization, training and selling of both
managers and accountants, and a hundred
times as much detailed systems design. 53
Furthermore, even if the structural aspects were tackled ahead
of the information aspects, DOD at that time had not gone be-
yond systems analysis within a program such as the systematic
choice of an airbase. Not a single attempt had been made to
incorporate more than one program within a single analytic
59
study. At that time, systems analysts working on individual
57
"Interview with DOD Comptroller," op. cit., p. 4.
58Robert Anthony, "Accrual Accounting May Be Coming," The
Federal Accountant , June 1975, p. 5.
59 See Frederick C. Thayer, "Productivity: Taylor ism Re-
visited (Round Three)," Public Administration Review , November/
December 1972, p. 834.
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programs worked in relative isolation from each other. They
had not transferred their experiences to civilian departments
where the overlapping and multiplicity of program objectives
were common.
4 . Timing of the Reform
While the comprehensive scope of implementation was
in keeping with the impetus provided by space successes,
Great Society programs, and the Vietnam war rolled into one
giant undertaking, they were also relevant to the timing of
the reform. These programs created huge increases in govern-
ment activities and expenditures. On one hand, systematic
analysis is more adoptable to new activities. On the other
hand, further delay on PPBS application will radically increase
the magnitude of old activities budgeted in the old manner.
In authoritarian set-ups, zero-budgeting, that is
considering all programs from zero and not recognizing repeat
activities, is restively easier. In democratic set-ups,
existing entitlements and authorizations once established
assume the status of a vested interest that has a useful
political clout. Some programs in the U. S. Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare have more than 12 authoriza-
tions or sources of funds aside from the annual budget. In
R. P., at the time martial law was declared, there were more
than 300 continuing appropriations on which authority funds
may be released aside from the annual budget. Thus, the ur-
gency of subjecting at least the new activities to PPBS, justi-
fied the timing of the implementation.
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Unfortunately, however, the war accelerated in South-
east Asia from 1965 onwards. Its financial demands made a
shambles of priority systems. The identification of PPBS
with what was sometimes called the most measured war and its
results affected its understanding and compliance. The in-
adequacy of PPBS to a hot war situation was actually foreseen
by its major proponents as far back, as the early 1960's. On
a lesser scale, all developing countries are in a crises of
this nature, where preoccupation with current problems drive
away the long-range outlook.
At any rate, the historicism of a political leader
will not allow the opportunity to initiate "the greatest man-
agement revolution in government" to slip away. President
Harding, as mentioned earlier, described the Budget and
Accounting Act of 1921 as "the greatest reformation in govern-
ment since the beginning of the republic."
B. RESULTS OF IMPLEMENTATION
The initial results of the foregoing strategy can be
gleaned from a chronology of presidential actions prior to
PPBS target fiscal year, FY 1968. In November 1966, the
President issued another memorandum persuading the department
heads to make "hard choices" and indicating that the Budget
Director would report to him quarterly on the progress of
PPBS. In January 1967, the budget message to the Congress
stated that the full effects of PPBS will not be felt until
later. The last presidential message on PPBS was on March
17, 1967, entitled, "The Quality of American Government" which
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said in the last paragraph: "The system has taken roots
throughout the government but it will not be able to function
fully until more trained men and women, more data, better
cost accounting, and new methods of evaluation are available."
The foregoing evaluation can also be interpreted as a re-
vision of earlier objectives of PPBS or a realization that
the expected results are forthcoming only in the long run.
Why was it then discontinued on June 21, 1971, at the Bureau
of Budget by the simple mechanics of not mentioning PPBS in
Circular A-ll, the annual ritual for the preparation of agency
budget requests?
There were numerous analyses, mostly theoretical and anec-
dotal, done during and after PPBS at the Federal government.
There were two empirical studies done on the difficulties and
pitfalls in the implementation of the system. The first one
was conducted by Bureau of Budget on the use of PPBS in 16
Federal agencies in mid-1968. The second, also with the per-
mission of Bureau of Budget, was a survey to examine the
U. S. Congress, Senate Committee on Government Operations,
Planning-Programming-Budgeting, Official Documents, 1967.
c
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The most notable are "Four Years of PPBS: An Appraisal,"
Stanley Botner, Public Administration Review , July/August
1970, pp. 423-431; John Dawson, "PPBS: Yesterday, Today, and
Tomorrow," Armed Forces Comptroller , Summer 1972, pp. 15-23;
and Allen Schick, "A Death in the Bureaucracy: The Demise of
Federal PPB," Public Administration Review, March/April 1973,
pp. 146-156.
f> "?
See E. L. Harper, F. A. Kramer, and A. M. Rouse, "Imple-
mentation and Use of PPB in Sixteen Federal Agencies," PAR ,
December 1969, pp. 623-634; and B. H. DeWoolfson, "Federal
PPB: A Ten Year Perspective," The Federal Accountant , Septem-
ber 1975, pp. 52-61.
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pitfalls in installing and operating PPB systems and what it
may have done to help decision-making in public organizations.
The dominant findings were that the difficulties encountered
by PPBS can be attributed mostly to the nature of planning in
America and the implementing strategy. The latter includes
difficulty in the use of systems analysis since there were no
adequate preparation, training, and data. But the structures
and analytical tools of PPBS were considered sound to the ex-
tent that the state-of-the-art allows.
A simple first answer to why it was discontinued at the
Executive level was that it was not an administrative reform
mandated by the Congress. Otherwise, it should have survived
a change in political administration and the legislative de-
bates would have provided necessary time to condition the
bureaucracy and set the machinery at the primary reform agency
- Bureau of Budget. This is, of course, on the assumption that
PPBS or some form of it would pass the Congress.
The relevance, however, of Congressional non-involvement
in PPBS was more on the divisive effects it wielded on the
executive departments who rely upon the Congress for the fund-
ing of their respective clientele that they share somehow with
divided groups and powers in the legislature. An executive
budget is a synthesis of department proposals in contrast with
particularization in a congressional budget. When the former
is in the form of a program budget but approved by the Congress
in the traditional and performance form, then the executive
departments would think more in terms of how resources are
obtained. It has been earlier mentioned during the transition
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to a executive budget that departments were described as
natural enemies of the President. In this manner bypassing of
the Congress actually reenforced tendencies of individual
agencies to avoid presidential overview.
This deduction was impliedly confirmed by a major finding
of a Bureau of Budget study in mid-1968 on the implementation
of PPBS: "...the close relationship between the relative
success in implementing PPBS and perceiving the system as
largely for agency use." This perception was not due to an
educated awareness that available tools were not suitable for
interagency program analysis; hence, Bureau of Budget must
only exercise technical leadership. The motivation was con-
trol and power, hence, the confusion in the ambiguity of
President Johnson's original statement on PPBS: that PPBS
would "improve our ability to control programs and our budgets
64
rather than having them control us." Whether control per-
tains to Bureau of Budget control over the departments or in-
cluding the Cabinet members over their respective bureaus was
never satisfactorily clarified.
This uncertainty also existed within the Bureau of Budget.
A dichotomy of interest may be gleaned from its later designa-
tion: Office of Management and Budget. The management group
E. L. Harper, "Implementation of PPB in Sixteen Federal
Agencies," PAR
, December 1969, p. 628.
64 See "Statement by the President to Members of the Cabi-




would naturally lean towards building up PPBS capability for
agency use while the budget group would want to use the agen-
cy's PPBS outputs to rationalize budget allocation. This
deduction is influenced by my experience with the R. P.
Commission of Budget wherein the Budget Operations Division
had strong centralizing tendencies while the Management Divi-
sion had the opposite.
The budget group, in turn, was divided between a small
PPBS staff, which at the peak did not reach more than 12
65
analysts, and the old and powerful budget review staffs.
The newcomers in the PPBS staff were isolated by a situation
where the old staff members did not understand the new methods.
Even PPBS instructions were contained in separate bulletins
away from the regular Circular A-ll until 1968. By this time,
the submission by the agencies of PM's and PFP ' s was a paper
mill, some of which were reported unsigned signifying that
the document was an output of the department's analytic staff
and not of the bureau or department head. The subsequent
amendment of implementing instructions and the identification
by Bureau of Budget of selected program issues to be subjected
to special studies did not considerably lessen the volume of
documents. The reason was that the old budget review staffs
who had closer relations with the Congress in the legislation
of the executive budget used the program papers to satisfy
congressional curiosity in a new budget system that they can-
not understand.
Schick, op. cit., p. 149
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The effectiveness of Bureau of Budget (BOB) leadership
and guidance can be appreciated in the light of its increased
responsibilities and changes in its nature. The huge in-
creases in Federal activities and expenditures resulted in
growing interrelationships between programs and agencies,
Federal, state, and local. The required shift in emphasis
from budget review and preparation to program planning and
evaluation was a change in style in making decisions and mak-
ing different decisions as well. At the same time, the shift
in orientation increased the information requirements at
Bureau of Budget level on the three budgetary classifications
- traditional, performance, and program. The elaborate de-
tails associated with object classification were due to:
first, the incomplete decentralization of accounting responsi-
bilities; second, the lack of adequate aggregation of those
activities at the Bureau of Budget level; and third, the de-
mands of the congressional appropriations committee for tradi-
tional data. While the increasing size and omplexity of the
bureaucracy, justified improved systems and procedures, the
very proliferation of organizational units, steering groups,
ad hoc committees, and coordinating committees provided the
first obstacles to systems operations.
The internal demands were aggravated also by external de-
mands. There was the so-called increasing presidential
orientation of the Budget Director, a phenomenon familiar in
R. P. An indicator of these external activities were the num-
ber of congressional hearings and coordinating conferences,
not including cocktail and golf appointments.
64

Because of difficulties encountered, Bureau of Budget
created an Office of Executive Management to develop solu-
tions to management problems created by increasingly complex
and interrelated programs. The priorities for attention were
made to shift from individual agencies to the growing number
of programs where agencies overlap and on systems for managing
fi fi
such programs. The Program Evaluation Staff was upgraded
to an Office of Program Evaluation which later was able to
identify 85 policy issues for FY 1971 planning and budgeting
cycle. An issue qualified as a major one if it had a budget-
ary impact of $50 M in 1971 or $500 M in the next five years.
Yet, in 1971, PPBS was discontinued.
What made the problems was that developmental pains were
already there when PPBS arrived. The. analysis by Allen Schick
68in this regard is: The Budget Bureau had already slipped in
prominence and capability, lost the lead in program develop-
ment to other offices in the White House, and no longer was
giving guidance to administrative management. Computerization
of information systems lagged behind the departments and the
traditional lines of communications became outmoded as the
programs became more interdepartmental and intergovernmental.
The main reason was the increase in government activities
with which the Budget Bureau, given its control orientation,








was unable to adjust and exercise control. A similar decline
in the R. P. Budget Commission resulted in the prolifera-
tion of economic staffs in the Office of the President until
69
they were integrated into one office recently.
In 1967, a presidential task force on Government Organi-
zation recommended that program management be strengthened at
the top levels with the Budget Bureau to have the lead role
in policy analysis, in line with PPBS concepts. This recom-
mendation was a validation of early program advocates who
stated that program budgeting must be preceded by some basic
organizational changes. President Johnson instead continued
with programmatic solutions by means of coordinating devices
such as interagency committees, task forces, and lead authori-
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ties.
In 1969, President Nixon pursued a revamp of the Executive
Office fashioned by another advisory council on Executive
Reorganization 'Ash Council) . The Domestic Council was es-
tablished as a new Executive Office and the Budget Bureau was
transformed into the Office of Management and Budget. In con-
trast with the preceding Heineman task force, the Domestic
Council was given the responsibility for program development
and OMB the job of coordinating Federal programs. As a
compromise in favor of government decentralization, the





executive departments were given representation in the Domestic
Council.
Meanwhile, the National Security Council machinery was
revitalized and strengthened. National Security Study Memo-
randum (NSSM) and National Security Decision Memoranda (NSDM)
which were analytical documents prepared by NSC started to
appear involving the efforts of former defense analysts.
While civilian PPBS was allowed to decay, DOD PPBS entered a
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new phase. With NSC policy guidance, DOD was unable to
provide fiscal ceilings to a system that was running $20
billion to $2 5 billion annual gap between the approved annual
portion of the Five-Year Defense Program and what was considered
feasible by the President for submission to the Congress. In
addition, the PPBS cycle was advanced by four months to take
care of decentralized decision-making in the armed services.
In the civilian departments, President Nixon proposed the
abolition of seven domestic departments, retaining two staff
departments, Justice and Treasury, and the creation of four
new departments organized around four major systems: spatial,
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social, environmental, and economic. A government-wide pro-
gram structure would not have looked very different from the
proposed reorganization. In DOD, the objectives sought in








cutting decisions of its Secretary by means of a mission-
oriented program budget. In the civilian departments, that was
not possible to be exercised by the Budget Director, since
short of the President until the creation of the Domestic
73Council, no one had full authority over domestic programs.
While the proposal to organize the executive branch was not
realized, it was nevertheless an attempt to enable the de-
partments to organize according to objectives before they can
budget according to objectives. As a result, there were three
movements in the Executive leading to the decay of PPBS at
Budget Bureau level: first, the elevation of major policy
analysis to councils above the Budget Bureau with machineries
of their own; second, the downgrading of Bureau of Budget to
management and performance budgeting while retaining a techni-
cal capability for supervision of department PPBS; and third,
increased participation of departments and bureaus in program
decision-making, representation in the Domestic Council, and
an equivalent participation of military departments at DOD.
The trend towards elevating policy and analysis to higher
levels in the executive branch had a parallel development in
the Congress. It was an irony that while the Congress was not
purposely involved in the implementation of PPBS, it began to
take interest when PPBS started to flounder in the executive
branch. In 1970, a Legislative Reorganization Act was en-
acted. This Act mandated five-year cost estimates for new
73Schick, op. cit., p. 153
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programs and directed GAO "to review and analyze the results
of government programs and activities carried on under exist-
ing law, including the making of cost-benefit studies," and
authorized the recruitment of persons "who are experts in
analyzing and conducting cost-benefit studies of government
74programs." Then, in 1974, a Congressional Budget and Im-
poundment Act, which created among other things a Congres-
sional Budget Office (CBO) . This office is headed by a for-
mer Program Evaluation Chief in the Department of Health,
Education and Welfare.
Remaining unanswered were the basic questions proposed by
Bureau of Budget to a management consultant firm, McKinsey
and Co., which was engaged to conduct an "integrated system
development effort" in mid-1967 after PPBS was already
a 75announced
:
1. How should the Executive Branch strengthen
its planning, evaluating, and decision-making
processes, particularly within the Executive
Office of the President?
2. What common denominator can be used to
provide the information necessary to conduct
the multiple perspective reviews of the
Bureau of Budget and yet obviate the present
necessity for preparing what in effect are two
separate budgets?
3. Will it be necessary to develop a govern-
ment-wide program structure to resolve this
"crosswalk" problem?
74 Schick, op. cit., p. 154.
75Botner, op. cit., p. 429.
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4. How elaborate and what should be the
substantive content of an improved informa-
tion system to support the recommended
changes which result from the resolution
of these questions?
C. PP3S EXPERIENCES IN OTHER COUNTRIES
In commenting on the early proposals for PPBS in the U.S.,
Wildavsky stated that in the guise of procedural change what
was actually being proposed is: "a revolutionary move which
would mean the virtual introduction of the British Parlia-
7 fi
mentary System if it is successful." All the other coun-
tries that adopted PPBS or a modified version of the system
have a parliamentary form of government. Because of the U.S.
experience, their implementing strategies were generally what
77
was described as a slow, feasibility-testmg approach. But
the common obstacles were inadequate analytical capability
and bureaucratic inertia rather than political environment.
The political structures are such that: first, the Parlia-
ment's influence on the pattern of public expenditures is
exercised in various indirect ways at the formative stage of
determining the pattern such that when the ruling party lay
down the budget before Parliament it is virtually unknown for
it to amend the budget; and, second, not only does central
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The scope of implementation covered all the depart-
ments simultaneously but the speed of reform was so phased
that the structural aspects of PPBS had priority over analy-
tical aspects. PPBS was initiated by insiders in the govern-
ment, specifically, the Treasury Board secretariat, which was
able to convince both the politicians and bureaucrats of the
need for PPBS and the manner of its implementation. Canada
has not had a reform of its traditional budget for the last
50 years. In 1966, the year of PPBS introduction, there was
impetus for reform provided by the reorganization of the pub-
lic service as a result of the findings of the Glassco Commis-
79 .
sion. The election of Trudeau as Prime Minister also pro-
vided a new approach to policy-making characterized as ration-
- .
.
. . . .
. 80
alist in orientation.
The concentration on program structuring enabled
Treasury to present before Parliament a program budget by FY
1970 replacing the old traditional budget. In addition, five-
year expenditure plans were accomplished for all departments
in what was conceived to be programs with cost breakdowns of
homogeneous activities and tentative measures of effectiveness
7 8pass the budget leading to the downfall of Whitlam's
government.
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It is the Royal Commission on Government Organization
which rendered its report in 1960.
80
G. B. Doern, "Mr. Trudeau, The Science Council, and PPB
Recent Changes in the Philosophy of Policy-Making in Canada,"
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The preceding reorganization of the public service minimized
overlapping of activities between departments. As a result
the Treasury did not have much difficulty in designing a
government-wide program structure because there were fewer
activities from different departments belonging to the same
functional program.
In the analysis aspect, three levels of analysis were
created: policy, program, and project. This Canadian version
of structuring analysis was in recognition of its political
and administrative structure and the limitations of its
analytical capability. They recognized that policy analysis
involved multiple goals that belong to the level of the Prime
Minister and the coordinating committees in Parliament such
as the Planning and Priorities Committee (PPC) . The technical
staff involved are the Privy Council Office (PCO) , mentioned
earlier, and the Prime Minister's Office (PMO) . Program
analysis dealt with two or three related goals and was the
proper domain of the Treasury Board secretariat and the de-
partments. There are also minor programs that have single
objectives. The Canadians renamed these programs as projects
and assigned them to departments concerned with the assistance
of the TB secretariat. These projects correspond to the per-
formance projects in the U. S. budget system. Success in the
analysis of these projects was attributed to PPBS in the
Canadian system.
While the program presentation was still a novelty to
Parliament and the cautious approach to program analysis
maintained the cooperation of the departments, the TB
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secretariat pursued the build-up of analytical capability in
a notably systematic manner. Earlier its enthusiasm was inter-
preted as an attempt on the part of one department to in-
crease its status and power in the Canadian public service.
Be that as it may, it did not create the animosity that new-
comers grafted into an existing bureaucracy commonly do. In
the latest manual it published in 1975, Operational Perform-
ance Measurement System (OPMS) , was the following:
Until very recently, the implied rationale
supporting the demands by departments for
increased program expenditures seemed to be
simply: the richer a program becomes, the
more effective it will be. Unfortunately,
the introduction of PPBS did not change this
attitude. The problem is that the alloca-
tion of funds by program and activity does
not provide the basis for satisfactory
evaluation of program performance or ex-
penditure proposals. The missing link is
the specification of outs and the identifi-
cation of the costs associated with their
production. The form and processes of PPBS
have been in place for some time; but too
often the analytical content is still con-
spicuously absent.
OPMS was actually preceded by a series of technical instruc-
tions that will serve as a gauge of the involvement of the TB
secretariat in the evolution of PPBS and the amount of effort
that is necessary for a reform of this nature:
1. Publication of Financial Management Guide
including highlights of PPBS. 1966.
2. General introduction of PPBS throughout
departments, requiring the classification of
expenditure proposals according to programs
and activities. This involves a comprehen-
sive review of the existing expenditure
coding system.
3. Publication of PPBS Guide which explains




4. Publication and regular maintenance of
the Program Forecast and Estimates Manual
which describes the form that expenditure
proposals to Treasury Board must take.
5. Development of a Benefit-Cost Analysis
Manual to assist departments in the evalua-
tion of proposed expenditure programs or
projects. 1973.
6. Promotion by Treasury Board of the MBO
process.
7. Publication of a Policy and Guide on
Financial Administration which replaces the
Financial Management Guide and which empha-
sizes the importance of cost identification
and which recommends techniques for this pur-
pose.
2 . United Kingdom
PPBS in Britain was preceded by the establishment of a
Public-Expenditure Survey System (PESS) as a result of the
Plowden report published in 1961. A major recommendation was:
"Decisions involving substantial future expenditures should
always be taken in the light of public expenditure as a
whole, over a period of years, and in relation to the pros-
es ipective resources." Two features of the system are worth
noting: first, it covers all expenditures by both local and
central government, thereby cancelling out the transfer pay-
ments between them. Second, the figures when presented to
the ministers are organized into broad functional programs,
for instance, defense, transport, housing, and law and order.
In 1970, a White Paper on the Reorganization of the
Central Government was issued. A Central Policy Review Staff







Analysis and Review (PAR) was designed. Ith the foregoing,
the spadework for the adoption of U. S. PPBS has been done.
However, the British had a much less comprehensive
strategy on PPBS. They started with the Ministry of Defense
by consolidating the analytical staffs previously dispersed
in the three military services into a Defense Operational
Analysis Establishment. In the civil departments, they did
not implement PPBS in either a single department or across
the board. Instead, a number of feasility studies were con-
ducted in two selected departments to determine whether and
how PPBS could be used. One of the departments was the Home
Office which has the Police Forces organized like the National
Police Forces of the Philippines. The strategy was further
refined to be able to concentrate from the bottom-up, starting
with local police authorities and subsequently aggregating to
provide a system at the national level.
The rationale for this approach is to provide managers
at the various levels in the policy system with better informa-
tion on the resources they control, "bearing in mind both the
cost of producing the information and the dangers in quantifi-
8 2
cation which can only too easily be concealed." The program
structure was fitted to the organizational structure of the




















Beyond the feasibility studies, almost all the effort has
gone into the development of the information base, mainly on
the cost side. It is their view that output budgeting in its
early years will naturally concentrate on the construction and
discussion of the program budget, since in many areas of
activity, the measurement of final output presents formidable
conceptual and practical difficulties.
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3 . Other Smaller Countries
Australia had conducted PPBS pilot studies in the
areas of education, health and transport. The Linz School of
Social Sciences and the University of Vienna have been com-
missioned by the government to develop analytical capability
in the public service.
Belgium has started in the areas of health and agri-
culture and has also commissioned the Institute Administrate





between funds allocated to capital investments, funded from
loans, and operating expenses, funded from taxes.
New Zealand started PPBS with priority to the account-
ing base in the Defense Department.
The Scandinavian countries, particularly Norway and
Sweden, have already sophisticated capital budgeting in rela-
tion to operational expenditures when PPBS was adopted in
their respective Defense Ministries.
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V. PPBS USES IN R.P.
A central issue in PPBS is the definition of the ultimate
objectives of government as they are realized through opera-
tional decisions. In this framework, the designation of a
program structure is a way of building a bridge between what
is government for and the administrative function of assign-
ing scarce resources among alternative objectives. In many
areas no clear objectives have ever been laid down. This is
true even in countries far more advanced than the Philippines
While a program structure offers a better organization
of objectives that will make visible the direction a govern-
ment is going, the state-of-the-art of analytical tools used
in PPBS has been found inadequate to cope with problems of
public policy choice. Systems analysis, by itself, or as a
part of PPBS, is mainly an economic approach to public deci-
sion-making. This approach views every decision as an alloca-
tion of resources, that is, an economic problem. Because it
cannot deal adequately with many critical, elements of public
policy choice, one must be forewarned of its important weak-
p c
nesses in this area of analysis:
1. Strong attachment to quantification and
dependence upon it, including both the need
for quantitative models and for quantitative
parameters for the variables appearing in
the models.
See YEHEZKEL DROR, "Policy Analysts: A New Professional
Role in Government Service," Public Administration Review,
September J 967, p. 198.
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2. Incapacity to deal with conflicting non-
commensurate values other than through neu-
tralizing the issue when possible by seeking
out value-insensitive alternatives.
3. Requirement of clear-cut criteria of
decision and well-defined missions.
4. Neglect of the problems of political
feasibility and of the special characteris-
tics of political resources (such as the
power-producing effect of using political
power)
.
5. Lack of rational treatment of essential
extra-rational decision elements, such as
creativity, tacit knowledge, and judgment.
6. Inability to deal with large and complex
systems other than through sub-optimization.
7. Lack of instruments for taking into account
individual motivations, irrational behaviour,
and human idiosyncracy
.
The caveat is even more useful for the reason that the
invasion of public decision-making by economics is unavoidable
because it is "the only highly developed theoretical basis for
8 6improvement in highly critical decision-making processes."
This has as much relevance in developing countries where the
main task is economic development regardless of recent slogans
that such goal is but one of the grand abstractions from the
West. One has only to look at the composition of the Cabinet
of the R.P. government, which formerly was dominated by law-
yers. In this light, the economic approach in systems analysis
and PPBS contributes to the improvement of public decision-
making for as long as its limitations are appreciated.
PPBS, therefore, cannot adequately cope with the problem





of social systems, especially in a situation of rapidly
changing goals and values. Nor is it the answer to the
goals of so-called welfare economists who have been seeking
a formula by which as many people as possible may be better
87
off without hurting anyone. This perspective of PPBS is
being stressed not because those who designed PPBS were ignor-
ant of its limitations, but because in the process of selling
a reform, limitations are often overlooked, resulting in a
boomerang effect that jeopardizes even its strong and useful
points.
A. PPBS AND R.P. GOVERNMENT REORGANIZATION
Among the ten major reforms instituted subsequent to the
proclamation of martial law is government reorganization with
88particular emphasis on development management. It was the
first presidential decree which is significant in the sense
that the reorganization plan has long been proposed, debated,
and amended in the defunct Congress, hence, its availability
for immediate promulgation, even in an emasculated form. As
mentioned in the introduction, one of its major objectives is
to enable departments to plan and implement programs in their
substantive fields with greater economy, efficiency and effec-
tiveness. A planning staff has been established in each
department with three complementary divisions: Planning and
See James S. Coleman, "The Possibility of a Social Wel-
fare Function," The American Economic Review , 1966, pp. 1105-22.
88Four-Year Development Plan, FY 1974-77, Condensed Re-
port, Republic of the Philippines, Manila, 197 3.
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Programming/ Project Development and Evaluation, and Research
and Statistics. A financial staff was created to integrate
existing budgeting, accounting, financial reporting, internal
auditing, and management improvement.
In addition to standardization of department staffs for
planning, programming, and budgeting, a coordinated develop-
ment of plans at national, regional, and local levels has been
provided by a creation of a central planning agency and a de-
partment of local government and community development. Line
departments have also been reorganized to ensure a more mean-
ingful focus on specific programs, for instance, a Department
of Tourism. On the other hand, many departments handling re-
lated programs were integrated.
A reorganization of this nature has not only provided
an impetus for budget reforms in other countries discussed
earlier, but has also simplified at least the program struc-
turing of PPBS. The more organizations are suited to the
plans and programs of government, the more congruent it will
be to a program structure. Program structuring, in turn,
will further point out organizational overlapping or duplica-
tion and whatever organizational units are unrelated or irrele-
vant to the goals of government. The interaction, however,
cannot go on indefinitely because reorganization does not
happen easily and complete rationalization of government
structure generally cannot be accomplished. Similarly, there
is no program structure made in heaven that is clear-cut and
and unambiguous that can be blessed as being a complete state-
ment of the objectives of society and government. For example,
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the military services will always have hospitals of their
own and a traffic cop will at one time or another serve as
an educator.
The value, however, of PPBS is not in what it can do to
improve the reorganization but in the structures and techni-
ques it provides for the rationalizing of development plans
for which the reorganization was done in the first place.
B. PPBS AND FISCAL CONTROL
On September 21, 1975, the R.P. President accepted the
89
resignation of the heads of GAO and Budget Commission. One
of the major problems was the increasing red tape in government
financial transactions which aggravated rather than improved
fiscal control. While replacements normally initiate
changes, the key concern is how fiscal control can be im-
proved by means other than more control.
As discussed on budget reforms before PPBS, fiscal
accountability is the key word and expenditure control is the
dominant activity of the traditional budget. R.P. government
can still be said to be in the traditional stage of budgeting
even if in form it has moved in certain areas to the perform-
ance stage. Characteristic of this budget orientation is the
accumulation of labyrinthine rules and regulations to take
care of accounting and auditing controls of units in the field
by central agencies, and, as an effect or cause, the
89 See "Top Level Government Revamp in Manila," Monterey
Peninsula Herald, September 21, 1975.
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accumulation of expertise in that area at the sacrifice of
general management by finance personnel. Under this condition,
those who know the ropes can ingeniously take advantage lead-
ing to more controls that cannot be phsycially enforced.
The evolution of PPBS revealed that budgeting moved
away from a control orientation only partially because there
were improvements in honesty and legality in the use of
government funds. While PPBS is pushed as an improvement in
fiscal control, it can also pull such control to a more solid
basis. First, PPBS calls for bigger decisions at the top.
With no Congress to demand bits and pieces of budgetary data,
central executive agencies will be able to concentrate on
policy matters that are of consequence to national develop-
ment. Management by exception is not only promoted by PPBS
but is a prerequisite to its implementation. Otherwise, a
paper mill will result out of the increase of information and
budgeting documents required by the system. Accordingly, in
the accounting area, the long delayed implementation of the
principle of decentralization of accounting responsibility to
heads of agencies that accompanied the introduction of per-
formance budgeting in 1957 will have to be realized. In the
area of auditing, the principles of auditing that was a vital
aspect of U. S. Budget and Accounting Procedures Act of 19 50
which was the basis of the R.P. Revised Act of 1954 will have
to be incorporated. In this manner, auditors will be principal-
ly involved as discussed earlier in evaluating the internal
controls of operating departments and developing measures of
efficiency and effectiveness of units and programs.
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Second, the lack of visibility of program costs alone
may help create a tendency in the line to worry primarily
about getting a budget and then bust it in almost any manner.
The level of expenditures for the current year, more untouch-
able than the politicians that legislated them, sets the stage
for the application of a convenient repeat plus a proportional
share formula for the next year's budget. A successful diver-
sion of funds, for example, to a capital acquisition will in-
sure an additional budget for operating expenses for the next
year. This behavior is reinforced by assignment of rhetorical-
ly determined program targets to government agencies. This
practice occasionally becomes necessary for political purposes.
With no predetermined relation between program costs and out-
puts, the fund mobilizer provides a hedge in required resources
only to shift some of these resources later to non-target areas
resulting in an artificially more efficient accomplishment of
program targets. Then, after the budget is allocated, fiscal
accountability dominates. There are disbursing officers,
accountants, and comptrollers to assume that. The line is
not only indifferent. So much effort is being exerted in the
acquiring of resources leaving little time for managing its
use. This is a veritable magnet for the central agencies to
increase paper control on the line and for financial personnel
to continue to narrow down administrative interests. Thus,
we are back to a vicious circle of more control and more
labyrinthine rules and regulations.
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C. PPBS AND DEVELOPMENT BUDGET
Because of the influence of Keynesian macro-economics,
an earlier invasion of public policy-making by economics,
developing nations rely on national income accounts in
development planning. Plans revolve around a magic number
of such and such annual increase in GNP or a certain decrease
in the balance of payments gap. How government programs should
contribute to such target increases in GNP and what such in-
crease means in terms of benefits to the people is not dis-
cernible. Moves in R.P. for a closer relationship between
planning and budgeting are so far in terms of coordination
between government agencies and consolidation of national in-
come information with budgetary data. For example, a Gross
National Product and Expenditures Account Calendar Year 1971-
73 was incorporated in the Budget for Fiscal Year 1973. In
addition, the annual budget contains an economic-functional
classification of national government expenditures which are
the five functional areas discussed in the introduction with
government departments and agencies listed under each.
Whatever is the argument against an approach to life
based on the principle of using monetary units as the common
denominator of what is important, there is now considerable
experience in such development planning. Unlike budget reforms,
economic plans have been actually and substantially tried out
even if most have ended in bitter experiences. Out of this
experience in developing nations is the emergence of the
Development Budget as a major tool through which the special
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requirements of initiating social changes can be met. In pre-
martial law R.P., such budget pertained to government programs
financed by loans, domestic and foreign, and foreign assis-
tance. On the expenditure side it is closely associated with
the concept of capital formation in the national income account-
ing. Thus, the development budget was involved in the purchas-
ing of goods and services of a durable nature, usually not
recurring such as dams, roads, and piers.
Alone that line, such budget has become symbolic as some-
thing more relevant to the people than the annual government
budget that incorporates it. The latter developed the connota-
tion in wrong places of a document maintained by politicians in
alliance with executive departments and administered by
bureaucrats. In contrast, the development budget is under the
care of so-called technocrats.
In 1973, a Presidential Development Budget Committee was
created, composed of the Secretary of Finance, Central Bank
Governor, NEDA Chief, and Commissioner of Budget. Its area
of interest is still capital budgeting but recently it has
moved to consider the budget as a whole. Under paragraph B2
of "Complementary Fiscal Policies and Administrative Reforms"
of the R.P. Budget for FY 1973 is the following:
2. Improvements in Budget Presentation and
Programming
A. Documentation of budgetary proposals
- We have initiated through the PDBC, im-
provements in the documentation of budgetary
proposals which are designed primarily to
reduce time and expense in the budget-making
process.
Beginning with FY 1973, the Perform-
ance type and Line-Item type of documentation
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will be printed almost simultaneously. In
FY 1974 and thereafter, both will be in-
corporated in a single document within the
alloted constitutional deadline.
B. The operational cash budget -
Through the Presidential Development Budget
Committee we have established the cash bud-
get system by which we have been able to
plan our disbursements with the available
cash. We have succeeded in significantly
reducing stop-gap financing and assured cash
availability when payment is due.
During my coordination with the committee staff
in 1973, the trend to tackle not only the administrative as-
pects of budgeting but the operating expenditures portion of
the budget was clear. The development budget has now .
included all expenditures recurrent or capital. Not only has
it become more convenient for the committee to do so without
pork-barrel patronages from politicians but of many bitter
experiences in lack of coordination between capital invest-
ments and operating expenditures. To this problem, the multi-
year perspective of PPBS is very responsive, that is, project-
ing the future years implications of present budgetary deci-
sions. For example are the many stretches of highways and
piers that after a few years are in a state of disrepair be-
cause maintenance costs were charged to manana to be able to
build more and more. By presenting an input-output-effect
analysis of selected programs that can still be mostly capital
investments, the development budget can provide a link be-
tween the macro-oriented economic planning and whatever micro-
budgeting is possible, and planning and budgeting in general.
The term development budget can certainly be more symbolic,
meaningful, and acceptable than program budget and PPBS and
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still serve the same purpose. In Turkey, the only developing
country that has instituted PPBS, the capital budget was
similarly a concern of a State Planning Organization (SPO)
and the operating expenditures on a traditional line-item sys-
90
tern was a 30b of the General Directorate of Budget (GDOB)
.
The budget reform reclassified both expenditures to a func-
tional and program type improving the coordination between in-
vestment and current expenditures of data and analysis for
the evaluation of projects by SPO and the determination of
current expenditures by GDOB.
D. AN IMPLEMENTING STRATEGY
The aim of this paper is not to determine how PPBS is im-
plemented. Going through a pattern of implementing, however,
is a way of summarizing the examination of PPBS and of further
appreciating the uses of the system. This paper concludes that
the direction of administrative reforms in the R.P. government
either leads towards a PPBS-type budget reform or at least
makes the adoption of some aspects of the reform easier and
inevitable. The reform period may take a decade or more, thus
in accordance with the exploratory and feasibility testing
90 See Gulay Coskun, "Budget Reform in the Republican
Government of Turkey," International Review of Administrative
Sciences
, 37, 4, 1974, pp. 330-336; and Mustafa Yulug, "Budget
Reform in Developing Countries with Special Reference to
Turkey," Ankara, 1970. The Turkish reform not only dealt with
capital investments but the more difficult area of relating
the quality and quantity of government personnel to the future
tasks of an agency or program. The reform covers an eight
year period, FY 69-77.
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approaches in other countries and the lessons of the U. S.
PPBS experience.
The watershed for this purpose is the declaration of
martial law. Under emergency rule, it has been possible to
undertake complementary reforms, which are reorganization,
personnel management, and budgeting and accounting. Reorgani-
zation is going on which, by no means, has been accomplished
by mere issuance of a decree. Government agencies are being
overhauled to conform with goals and programs of government.
A budget reform alone cannot conceivably achieve this feat
which is a prerequisite and objective of such reform. The
basic aim of an organization, by theory and experience, is
to survive. PPBS alone could not have dented the resistance
of the bureaucracy. It turns out that organizational patterns
are conforming to the goals of government, thereby allowing,
prospectively, more congruence to a program structure. Thus,
program structuring, in a preparatory sense, has started and
when it is actually done will help fine-tune the reorganiza-
tion. The experiences of Canada, United Kingdom, and Turkey
are examples of this interaction. The proposed reorganization
of the U. S. executive departments along major systems of
space, social, environment, and economics though unrealized
has been attributed to the influence of program structuring.
The reorganization in R.P. also provided for planning and
budgeting staffs at the departments, Budget Commission, and
at the central planning agency. The manning and training of
these staffs are also a prerequisite and objective of budget
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reforms. In the area of personnel, the trail is being
blazed by many changes in the top levels of the
the Civil Service Commission and the shake-up of its middle
management. More importantly, the stage was set for the zero-
budgeting of political patronage employees in many government
programs. This problem has been handled with care for the
last three years because of its social costs as perceived by
a regime which is aware that social surgery is complicated.
Nevertheless, the manning of analytical staffs is con-
strained by the supply of analytical skills. Developing
nations, however, have too often cringed in inferiority com-
plex before management systems that are actually less compli-
cated than they sound. To pursue this attitude is to be
damned to the realm of the impossible in the present condi-
tion of admitted mismanagement in the developed countries,
themselves. The generalization of lack of skills in develop-
ing countries is actually the nonuse of qualified people
either because of political and legal restrictions or lack
of adequate means of employment. Otherwise, the developed
world would not have had the benefit of brain drains. The
supply of analysts is inadequate only to the extent of the
demand, which has two features: first is in relation to the
comprehensiveness of PPBS application and speed of reform
desired; and second, the lack of demand for analysis itself
by the leadership or management. The latter is a vicious
circle that starts with either supply or demand. A strategy,




The planning and budget staffs have actually an initial
demand for analysis: the relating of department plans and
budget to the national development plan as a primary reorgani-
zation objective. In this respect, the departments with
manned planning staffs will be made to commence examining and
identifying the missions of their respective departments be-
fore they can intelligently look at the bigger national pic-
ture. This will be done at the technical initiative of the
planning staff of the Budget Commission even v/ithou the fuss
of a PPBS decree. In the process they are expected to find
out that there are programs and activities cutting across
organizational lines, in spite of the reorganization. At this
stage, the decision-maker is provided the benefit of analysis
as to whether to proceed with reorganization to closely
correspond with the hierarchy of objectives or to bend the
program structure a little to take advantage of the pattern
of managerial responsibility. The experiences in other coun-
tries revealed that it does not pay to indefinitely engage
in program structuring since there are many programs and
activities that are clear and unambiguous enough for a start-
er. It is enough at this stage to establish a general inter-
relationship since the program structure is yet to face a re-
thinking when the outputs are analyzed in terms of the objec-
tives and when an accounting subsystem is designed to accommo-
date the new demands on information.
The preceding exercise can make the same easier at the
level of the Budget Commission in the form of a government-
wide program. Working with the Reorganization Commission,
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they can marry the government hierarchy of objectives with
a program. When the process reaches the level of the central
planning agency, the critical programs which have actually
been formulated in an ad hoc basis will be visible in their
relationship with the departments and bureaus. In addition,
reasonably clear-cut programs with fairly narrow target areas
can be further identified instead of making another round
over the national program structure. A criteria for choosing
these programs are:
1. Expenditures of a substantial amount of
money using a peso threshold.
2. Presence of reasonable and politically
viable options now and in the near future.
3. Availability of information or can be
inexpensively developed.
4. Presence of a fairly demonstratable
relationship between inputs and outputs.
With these selected programs as the priority, accounting sub-
systems will then be redesigned. The integration of budgeting
and accounting subsystems with programming will permit the
collection of historical cost information which is not possi-
ble except through costly studies. Such information permits
increase accuracy in forecasting costs of program changes.
A link of planning and performance is thus made possible, for
accounting shows what, if anything, happened as a consequence
of a planning decision.
The introduction of the accounting aspect in this strategy
is borne by the adverse experience in other countries that
91 See Frederick Mosher, "Limitations and Problems of PPBS
in the States," PAR , April 1969, pp. 160-166.
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while a program structure can be designed at headquarters,
in this instance, the planning staffs, an accounting system
involved the line and staff. For example, the redesign of
the U. S. government accounting systems to accrual basis is
projected to be completed in 1980.
To pursue an accounting change will require the first bud-
get reform-related decree. In essence, this presidential
participation is but a correction of the R.P. Revised Budget
Act of 1954 which missed a lot of the accounting and auditing
aspects of its model - the U. S. Budgeting and Accounting
Porcedures Act of 1950. This decree will include the creation
of a Joint Financial Management Program to be formulated by
a committee composed of the Auditor General, Budget Commis-
sioner, National Treasurer, assisted by a permanent secretari-
at. This body will supervise the design and installation of
the accounting subsystems and such other related financial
management programs.
While the long process of accounting redesign is being
undertaken, the planning and budget staffs resort to "cross-
walking" of data from the existing budget to the program bud-
get for a preliminary appreciation of program costs. These
are actually being done in some bureaus of the government.
On a tentative and perhaps training basis, the outputs of
selected programs can then be analyzed in terms of their
objectives.
The formidable conceptual and practical difficulties
of determining final output will then be confronted. What will
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result from this step is the earlier determination of outputs
of reorganized departments and bureaus corresponding to the
performance budget. When these outputs are congruent with the
program outputs, then they satisfy the requirement at this
stage. Even so, the outputs that will be determined will per-
tain to program effects that are usually multi-purpose,
hence, intermediate or proxies of nonquantif iable effects.
This inherent difficulty was approached in the Canadian
experience by a tri-level systematic analysis: policy, pro-
gramme, and project. As explained earlier, a project is a
programme renamed, which is single goal-oriented; a programme
deal with two or three related goals; and matters of policy
involving multiple goals. Canada is still in the project
level and is in the process of developing operational measure-
ments for the programme level. Thus, following that example,
R.P. will only be dealing with what is actually required by
an existing law - the Revised Act on performance budgeting,
initially. There are many examples of projects where measures
of efficiency is relatively clear and where operational tasks
can be meaningfully evaluated. In addition to those activi-
ties described in the fundamentals of PPBS, there is, for
example, the current question of government office space in
the Greater Manila area. Each department can forecast its
needs for space and then run cost-benefit analysis to see if
it would be better to rent or build new offices. In turn,
these activities can be coordinated at the Budget Commission
level that one department may not be renting two thirds of a
floor. Included in this analysis by the Budget Commission
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will be indirect costs, that is, such hidden costs to the
city for sewer and water extensions which any new office may
require and which may not be that important to departmental
analysis
.
Since the second level of systematic analysis, that is,
those programs with still ambiguous outputs, will be awaiting
the development of the accounting system and supporting sys-
tems for output measurement, zero-budgeting will not be re-
sorted to in these categories. This leads us now to what
use PPBS is to policy analysis.
The limitations of PPBS to conduct policy analysis has
been presented as a caveat earlier. A rationalist approach
to policy-making requires a more multi-disciplinary approach
in contrast with a primarily economic approach in systems
analysis. Even if the R.P. President has surrounded himself
with economists and managers, it is not likely he will fully
rely on quantification of issues where he has succeeded by
intuition and judgment. On the other hand, he did not declare
a martial law to muddle through in the tradition of so-called
incrementalists . Expectedly, when faced with two diametrical-
ly opposed approaches to policy-making, he will go for the
middle ground. Etzioni provided a third form which draws
elements from the other two, resulting perhaps in a more
workable approach. A rational approach, he said, requires
greater resources than decision-makers command. An increment-
al approach, on the other hand, disregards the possibility of
innovations, while a "mixed-scanning approach" involves
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rationalist examination of some policy areas and a truncated
92look at other areas.
The last aspect of strategy is the timing of the reform.
This paper suggests that the target completion of the reform,
as a basis for when to start it, be left to the process of
implementation itself where PPBS in its interaction with the
administrative and political environment has its effective
uses. It is also suggested that the reform has long started
and that the more formal aspects of the reform should be so
started to be a working system at the time the parliament is
convened since martial law cannot stay forever to make reforms
possible.
92 See A. Etzioni, "Mixed-Scanning: A Third Approach to
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